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narrowing that historiographical gap. Its purpose is to extend the oftdebated history of the Asante kingdom into the twentieth century through an examination of the National Liberation Movement. It seeks to understand the NLM on its own terms, as part and parcel of Asante history, not as a brief aberration in the national history of Ghana. Though it is a story of continuity and of Asante tenacity, it is by no means the story of a nation united on an historic march to reclaim its right to self-determination. Indeed, to grapple with the twentieth-century tenacity of Asante nationalism -as manifested in the NLM -is to grapple with the historically-rooted contradictions of that nationalism and to confront many of the social and economic conflicts which pervaded Asante history for at least a century before the NLM's inauguration.
Although many in Accra -CPP members and colonial officials alikereacted with surprise, if not disbelief, at the news of the NLM's founding, there had been indications as early as November, 1953 that some Asantes were beginning to question the government's blueprint for independence. The first murmurs of discontent arose during the debate over the distribution of seats for the new Legislative Assembly -the body envisioned as leading the Gold Coast to independence. A government report provided for the allocation of seats based on the population of the regions, allotting Kumase two seats and the Region nineteen.5 In a legislative body which was to contain 104 seats, roughly 20 per cent would represent Asante. This allocation reflected a decline from Asante's 25 per cent share of seats in the 1951 Council. As far as the Asante representatives were concerned, the report reflected a total insensitivity to the historic, economic and political importance of Asante to the Gold Coast. Asante, they argued, should be entitled to no fewer than thirty seats. B. F. Kusi, who had resigned from the CPP a year earlier and who would become a staunch supporter of the NLM a year later, told the Council:
All Ashantis express the sentiment that Ashanti is a nation and that fact has been accepted. We are not a region at all; we should be considered as a nation.... Population alone does not make a country.6 But despite the burning nationalist pleas of many Asante representatives, the government's report was adopted. Many in Asante decried what they considered to be the government's total insensitivity to Asante's special position in the Gold Coast. Their bitterness was not to subside quickly.
A few months later, Asante discontent with the CPP surfaced within the offices of the CPP itself. As the June 1954 election approached -the election heralded as the last before independence -CPP candidates had to be chosen to stand for the 21 seats in Asante. In many cases, local constituencies disapproved of the candidates selected by Nkrumah and the CPP's Central Committee and submitted their own candidates for registration, defying the party's central authority.7 As the election drew near some members agreed to accept party directives and removed their names from the ballot, but 32 in Asante chose to stand as independent candidates. Nine days before the election these Asante candidates were among the 8i 'rebels', as Nkrumah termed them, publicly expelled from the CPP at a mass rally held in the Subin River valley in Kumase.8 But the Subin valley had not seen the last of the Asante rebels.
On I3 August, the government passed an amendment to the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds Bill which fixed the price of cocoa at 72 shillings per 6o lb. load -a price which represented only one-third of the average prevailing world market price.9 The Asante rebels were among those who galvanized opposition in Asante to this government ruling; in the process they transformed the campaign for a higher cocoa price into a political struggle. A leaflet circulating in early September, authored by one of the rebels, made the political connections explicit: It was abundantly clear that cocoa and Kotoko would stand at the heart of the struggle. Within a few weeks, Asante opposition to the cocoa price mushroomed into a broad-based Asante struggle against the CPP, its economic policies and its blueprint for self-government. The Ashanti Pioneer, a local paper whose owner, John Tsiboe, had opposed the CPP from its inception, published an editorial which proclaimed: Great events ... from little causes spring. Like an innocent match flame, the strange attitude of the all African CPP Government to the simple demand of farmers for a higher local price of cocoa has gone a long way to threaten to set ablaze the petrol dump of Ashanti nationalism.1' On I 9 September, in the Subin River valley, that 'petrol dump' was officially ignited as tens of thousands participated in the inauguration of the Asante National Liberation Movement. ' The youngmen of Asante had been a potent and active political force since at least the mid-nineteenth century when they were known as the nkwankwaa, a term which has been consistently rendered in English as 'youngmen'. The sense of the term was not that the nkwankwaa were literally 'young', but that they existed in often uneasy subordination to elder or chiefly authority."5 As Wilks writes of the nineteenth-century nkwankwaa, they were men who 'belonged to old and well-established families but whose personal expectations of succeeding to office or even of acquiring wealth were low '.16 Channels for political advancement were obstructed by the traditional requirements of office; channels for economic advancement were obstructed by both the state and its monopoly on trade and what could be termed the rising bourgeoisie or asikafo (literally, 'men of gold' or 'rich men')." Perhaps best described as an emerging petite bourgeoisie, with an economic base in trading and rubber production and economic interests directed at the establishment of free and unencumbered trade with the coast, the nkwankwaa, according to Wilks, probably acquired 'their first experience of political action in the anti-war and anti-conscription movements' of the late i86os and early i870s.18 It was in the i88os, however, that the nkwankwaa made their first serious bid for political power in Asante. It was the Kumase nkwankwaa who, angered when Asantehene Mensa Bonsu raised taxes and imposed heavy fines for petty offenses, took a leading role in the movement which eventually overthrew the Asantehene in i883.19 Capable of mobilizing the support of the ahiafo (the 'poor' or 'under-privileged'), and in alliance with the asikafo, whose economic standing was also threatened by Mensa Bonsu's austerity measures and his state trading system, the nkwankwaa IF The etymology of the term ' nkwankwaa' is somewhat murky. Its root is undoubtedly 'nkoa' which can be translated as 'subject' or 'commoner'.
But as Busia noted, nkwankwaa was often used synonymously with mmerante (literally, 'young men'). Clearly, nkwankwaa has come to have a very specific meaning -much more limited than 'commoner', and transcending, in many cases, the chronological or generational designation of mmerante. (During the 1950s, the youngmen active in the NLM ranged in age from twenty to fifty.) See Tordoff, Ashanti, 374 ff. and K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London, I95I), I0 ff. In reference to the nineteenth century, Wilks defines nkwankwaa as 'literally "youngmen " and sometimes translated as "commoner"'.
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17 Ibid. 5 3 5-9 and 7 I 0-I I 18 Ibid. 535. Unfortunately, more precise data on the early nkwankwaa are not available. As Wilks points out, 'The leaders...in the early i88o's, as is appropriate to a movement which although popular and mass-based had necessarily to be organized in secrecy, are not identified in contemporary reports (p. 535). Thus, it is difficult not only to pinpoint the nkwankwaa's origins in time but to examine their specific social and economic grievances.
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were able to carry out a successful coup against the Asantehene; and since they were 'unconvinced of the virtues of a monarchical system', they were able to bring Kumase under a 'republican form of government' or a 'Council of commoners and chiefs', albeit for only a brief period.20 Though the nkwankwaa had made a serious bid for political power in the i88os, their long-term goals differed markedly from those of the asikafo and ahiafo. In the last years of Asante sovereignty, the nkwankwaa were unable to forge a lasting political alliance capable of effecting a dramatic change in Asante politics.2' By I9OI, Asante was under the complete control of the British and the nkwankwaa faced an entirely new political and economic landscape. In the first three-and-a-half decades of the century, before the consolidation of indirect rule in Asante, the nkwankwaa, according to a 1924 colonial report, enjoyed a 'feeling of independence and safety which gives vent to criticism of their elders, and a desire when dissatisfied to take the law into their own hands'.22 Their relationship with Asante's traditional authorities remained uneasy at best. Throughout the I 920S, the nkwankwaa's involvement in destoolment cases against numerous amanhene ('paramount chiefs') alarmed government officials and traditional authorities alike.23 With their social and economic position bolstered by the growth in trade and the spread of education, the nkwankwaa became more resentful of the powers exercised by the chiefs, namely their ability to levy taxes and impose communal labor requirements. In I930, the nkwankwaa were particularly outraged by news that the Kumasihene, Nana Prempe I, and his chiefs were considering a law which would require that a percentage of a deceased person's property be given to the Kumasihene and his chiefs. In a letter to the Chief Commissioner, they warned that it was a similar measure which led to the overthrow of Mensa Bonsu in I883. After discussions with the Chief Commissioner, Nana Prempe I dropped the issue.24
That the nkwankwaa have origins dating back nearly a century before the founding of the NLM clearly has implications for our understanding of the events of I954-7. Specifically, these pre-colonial origins allow for an historical (though admittedly tentative ) class analysis of the youngmen -an analysis which repeatedly points to the nkwankwaa's reliance upon strategic alliances or popular fronts which they have forged with other groups in Asante society to further their own aims, be it an end to conscription, the abolition of communal labour, a lessening in taxes, or the opening up of free trade with the Coast. The nkwankwaa have been artful initiators of these alliances, capable of winning the support of the asikafo and ahiafo. Historically, they have also turned to the chiefs (or certain elements within the ruling elite) to gain the support and legitimacy necessary to further their causes.
That the nkwankzwaa have had to turn to others, particularly to the chiefs, points to their weakness as a class. It also goes some distance toward explaining their pivotal and dynamic role in the turbulence of Asante politics the last fifty years. No longer rooted primarily in petty trade and small scale rubber production, the youngmen of the post-World War II period were an economically diverse lot. Most had attained some degree of education which led them into such burgeoning occupations as journalism, teaching, accounting and clerking.29 Some were shopkeepers and small-scale traders and some, were involved in cocoa production (if only in a small way). They were not chiefs (though many were related to chiefs) and they had no realizable aspirations to chiefly office. They can also be distinguished from the old guard intelligentsia -the relatively sparse, though politically significant, group of Asante professionals like K. A. Busia and I. B. Asafu-Adjaye -who had been trained to inherit the government upon the departure of the British, but who had been left out after the dynamic rise of the CPP. They were not the indigent or ahiafo, nor were they the asikafo whose wealth was based in a powerful combination of land ownership, large-scale cocoa and timber production, trading, transport and construction.30 They were, quite simply, the youngmen, the nkwankwaa, or, for lack of a less cumbersome class definition, the petite bourgeoisie.
Perhaps what most distinguished the youngmen of the post-World War II era from the nkwankwaa of the previous decades was that they participated in (and, in some cases, helped to initiate) the mass nationalist movement. Many, including Kusi Ampofu, Osei Assibey-Mensah and Sam Boateng, played key roles in the founding of the CPP in I949. For them, Nkrumah's party was the organization of the 'common man', the vanguard in a struggle against colonial rule and against the power and privilege of chiefly authority. Thus, the youngmen spearheaded the CPP drive into Asante and, in the process, they mastered the arts of mass mobilization, organization and propaganda. Only a few years later, these skills would be put to the test when the youngmen broke with the CPP and prepared to 'fight fire with fire'. In I954, though the political and economic landscape of Asante had changed dramatically since the I88os, the goals of the Asante nkwankwaa were not so different from those of their predecessors. The youngmen continued to seek political power, and through it, economic power. However, instead of confronting the Asante state, the nkwankwaa were now confronting 29 It is interesting to note that the four AYA members who played the most pivotal roles in the founding of the NLM -Kusi Ampofu, Sam Boateng, K. A. M. Gyimah and Osei Assibey-Mensah -were all journalists by trade.
30 This is not to suggest that in the Asante of the I 950s there were four neatly packaged social classes or groups -the chiefs, the asikafo, the nkwankwaa and the ahiafo. The categories were not mutually exclusive, particularly with reference to the chiefs and the 'big men' or asikafo. Many chiefs, particularly the Kumase Divisional Chiefs (nsafohene), were wealthy landowners with an economic base in cocoa, transport and trading. At the same time, many of the asikafo aspired to traditional office and much of their wealth and power depended on maintaining a close relationship with, and courting the favours of, the traditional ruling powers. In an article dealing with wealth and political power in the nineteenth century, but with applicability to the twentieth century, Wilks notes that 'the analytically distinct categories of the office holders (amansohwefo) and the wealthy (asikafo) are, in terms of actual membership, largely overlapping ones; that is, office holders became wealthy through the exercise of their office, and persons of wealth acquired office through the use of their money'. Wilks, 'The Golden Stool', 17 and passim. the CPP -a party which they had helped to found and build, a party through which they had sought to reach the political kingdom and all else that would follow.3" Their break with the CPP, though precipitated by the freezing of the cocoa price, was based primarily on a growing perception that the CPP was no longer providing a means toward political and economic advancement; it was no longer offering the political kingdom to the majority of Asante's youngmen. The government's allocation of seats in the Legislative Assembly and the CPP's selection of candidates for the I954 election were cited as prima facie evidence that the CPP did not and could not represent the youngmen of Asante. The freezing of the cocoa price and a development policy that was based on the expropriation of wealth from Asante cocoa farmers only served to reinforce the youngmen's growing alarm that the CPP was seeking to build its kingdom on the backs of Asantes without giving the youngmen of Asante a voice in that kingdom or allowing them to reap its rewards.
And just as the nkwankwaa of the i88os had turned to Akyempemhene Owusu Koko in their bid to depose Mensa Bonsu, the youngmen of the 1950S turned to the paramount chiefs of Asante in an effort to legitimize their movement, culturally and politically, against Nkrumah. They believed that the support of the chiefs was an ideological necessity: the chiefs would bring with them the support of the spirits and ancestors of the entire nation and the struggle against Nkrumah would become the struggle of the Asante nation against political slavery, economic slavery and 'black imperialism'.
It was recognized in September, 1954 But Nkrumah's conception of national liberation, though broad enough to encompass the entire African continent, was not broad enough to encompass the demand, within his own country, for self-determination in Asante. Thus, the social conflict within Asante has continued to take a back seat to Asante's broader struggle with the central government. The definition of Asante selfdetermination remains the definition offered by Asante's ruling class on the eve of independence and Asante nationalism remains the province of a ruling class which has consistently used it to foster its own privilege. Asante's youngmen, those who were the catalyst behind the 1954 resurrection of Asante Kotoko, remain locked in an historical limbo, prisoners of a nationalism so defined as to render them incapable of effectively challenging Asante's ruling class. Social and economic hegemony continues to be the preserve of those chiefs and political intellectuals who, since gaining control of the NLM, have held securely the reins of power in Asante. Those nameless, faceless men and women -the small-scale cocoa farmers, the abusa labourers and the urban workers whose militance and mass support made the NLM an imposing force -stand in foreboding stillness. They have not, as some predicted, been integrated into the modern civil state. They have been, quite simply, disarmed and silenced. 
